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REPORT NO

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CENTRAL INTECLIGENCE AGENCY TON INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

25X1A 460

COUNTRY

Philippines

DATE DISTR.19 Nov. 1951

94-1187

SUBJECT

Statements of HMB Theorist in October 1951 Suggesting NO. OF PAGES 2 Nacionalista Victory Might Retard Communist Plans

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
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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



- 1. An unidentified HMB theorist stated late in October 1951 that if HMB plans to sabotage the Philippine elections were unsuccessful, the HMB would be obliged to contend with the Nacionalista Party, and that since Nacionalista leaders are more honest and more competent than Liberal Party leaders, the Philippine Communist revolution would thus be retarded.
- 2. Failing a successful campaign of sabotaging the elections, the HMB desired that Liberal Party politicians remain in power, since Liberal Party maladministration is accelerating the course of the Philippine Communist revolution, according to the HMB theorist.

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The desire to keep a corrupt government temporarily in power is believed to be customary among Communists who are seeking a national revolution. Aside from the question of the relative honesty or competence of Liberal and Nacionalista Party politicians, it is noteworthy that the comparatively clean 1951 elections which bolstered public morale probably had a significant harmful effect on the HMB.

The failure of the HMB to succeed in sabotaging the elections, as HMB plans and orders previously had emphasized strongly, suggests that over-all HMB capabilities may be low. While the alertness of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) undoubtedly hampered HMB election plans, this fact should not result in lowered HMB morale and confidence.

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dated 10 October 1951 which was prepared by Philippine Military Intelligence Service officials of probable political and military developments throughout the country in the month preceding the 13 November elections. In these reports it was suggested that assistance given to HMB election plans by irresponsible Liberals and Nacionalistas would result in a more favorable climate for HMB propaganda and recruitment and a lowering of anti-Communist resistance in the Philippines. In the latter report, it was also suggested that if Government efforts to frustrate HMB election plans were successful, hard-

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pressed HMB forces in Luzon may order the elements in Mindanao to begin a campaign of open resistance.



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